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I. Introduction
In their thought-provoking book, Red Families v. Blue Families: Legal
Polarization and the Creation of Culture, Naomi Cahn and June Carbone
examine conflicting views on family formation in the "culture war."'
Mirroring the electoral maps of 2004 and 2008, the authors contend that
regional differences between Republican and Democrat voters correspond
to deeply held beliefs about family values. 2 The "blue" family paradigm
is essentially liberal: It stresses individual equality, tolerance of diverse
lifestyles, and a role for government in helping people achieve education-
al and economic success. "Red" families are conservative. They value tra-
dition, as expressed in religious beliefs or longstanding cultural mores,
and they expect the state to respect these values.
But, as Cahn and Carbone show, differences of ideology do not account
for the divergent choices that red and blue families make. Neither red nor
blue families practice what they preach. Blue families may "bristle at
restrictions on sexuality, insistence on marriage, or the stigmatization of
single parents," but they raise children in committed, long-term relation-
ships after delaying marriage.3 Red families disavow premarital sex and
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION
AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
2. Id. at 5. See also Interview with Professor June Carbone, National Public Radio, May
9, 2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126653602 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2010).
3. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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proclaim the merits of marriage, but have higher rates of teenage preg-
nancy and divorce, as well as lower marriage rates.4
In three parts, Cahn and Carbone capture the entrenched divisions
between red and blue families and explain how opposing opinions and
practices around family formation inform debates over abortion, same-sex
marriage, and abstinence-only education. Supported by rich historical,
sociological, and cognitive research, they analyze how the views of com-
munities where many marry young, have children as teenagers or young
adults, and divorce early, differ from those in which people postpone
childbirth and marriage.' Cahn and Carbone propose changing the sub-
jects of policy from sex to commitment, from abortion to contraception,
and from family to work can help forge common ground between red and
blue families.6
The book's task is a difficult one. By virtue of their subject, Cahn and
Carbone rely on generalizations about how large groups of people vote,
think, and act to describe why the national conversation about family val-
ues is so polarized. Even though Cahn and Carbone acknowledge the
influence of race and class, the importance of these characteristics may be
still too understated. Moreover, changing the subject of the nation's fam-
ily values conversation may not address the causes of division identified
by the authors.
Part I of this review describes the evidence that Cahn and Carbone
offer in explaining differences in blue and red ideologies and choices. Part
II considers their treatment of the contentious issues at the core of red/
blue disagreement and suggests a contrasting view of laws mandating
parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions. Part III analyzes the
book's solutions for redirecting current debate and contemplates limita-
tions to Cahn and Carbone's approach.
II. The Scope and Cause of the Cultural Divide
In the first part of Red Families v. Blue Families, Cahn and Carbone
cite statistics and studies that reveal how birth and marriage patterns align
with voting preferences. Northeast and mid-Atlantic states, which vote
Democratic, have lower rates of teen, nonmarital births, whereas states
voting Republican (concentrated in the South) have the opposite.' The
authors make clear that their purpose is not to prove causal relationships
or to discount the influence of "other cultural constructs."8 For example,
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 31.
6. Id. at 7-9.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 30 (giving the example of middle class or wealthy red families).
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nonmarital birthrates may "reflect race more than geography:" 9 Latinas
and African Americans have higher rates of teenage pregnancy, child-
birth, and abortion than whites.o When controlling for race, the highest
and lowest rates of nonmarital births for whites are in both red and blue
states." Voting preferences are thus an interesting, but not always accu-
rate, indicator of family formation.
State statistics on marriage and childbirth, however, only explain part
of the culture divide that Cahn and Carbone map. The modem informa-
tion-technology economy, which depends on an educated workforce,
helped create a "new middle class morality" that made the blue family
possible.' 2 With the Industrial Revolution, American agrarian society,
which relied on large families, gave way to employment in industry.' 3
Factory work centered in urban areas enabled a new class of men to make
living wages for smaller families. At the same time, divorce was stigma-
tized and hard to obtain, and unwanted pregnancy resulted in marriage.' 4
The authors explain that as industrial jobs went overseas and disappeared
at home, so too did the prospect of blue-collar work that would support an
entire family. Instead, a new information economy, reliant on technolog-
ical innovation, demanded an educated workforce that included women."
As both women and men reaped the financial rewards of higher educa-
tion,16 marriage became less central to the production of wealth."
Resulting changes in sexual behavior and gender roles met resistance,
manifested in calls for sexual restraint before marriage and a "return" to
traditional family structures.' 8 Cahn and Carbone argue that feeding the
backlash was resentment of the ways that the new economy rewarded the
"new middle class morality." 9 An individual benefited from ending a teen
relationship for the promises of college; delaying marriage to a college
girl/boyfriend to start a career; and waiting to have children until settling
9. Id. at 29. See also id. at 11 (noting that family formation in minority communities does
not necessarily follow a red or blue pattern).
10. Id. at 23, 29.
11. Id. at 29.
12. Id. at 36-37.
13. Id. at 34.
14. Id. at 119.
15. Id. at 35-36.
16. Id. at 37-41.
17. Id. at 58.
18. One of the more well-known accounts of the resistance to changing gender norms is
SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST WOMEN 241 (1991); see also
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 377 (2007) (characterizing opposition to legalized abortion as a "vision
that is intensely concerned. . . about the role of women, sex, family, and religion in American
life").
19. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 207.
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in a stable job and place. Unlike previous generations, those who wait to
have children until their late twenties or thirties are unlikely to remain
abstinent until marriage and will probably avail themselves of legal con-
traceptives and abortion.
Drawing on adolescent brain development research, Cahn and
Carbone describe the benefits of choosing to have children later in adult-
hood. 20 Older parents are more mature, stable, and risk-averse. 2' The blue
parents who embody the middle class morality "embrace the transforma-
tion [from adolescence], teach young people to wait, and consider age
appropriate interventions to reconcile exploration with responsibility."22
Behavior inconsistent with the norms of the new morality is not similar-
ly rewarded: early marriage or childbirth is harder to support financially,
can deter education, and limit mobility.23 Cahn and Carbone argue that
the blue lifestyle provides practical reasons for birth control and abor-
tion, 24 while the red approach views women's control of their reproduc-
tive capacity as a threat to traditional values.25
Cahn and Carbone rely on cognitive science to explain why people in
red states would retain values unrewarded by financial gain.26 They argue
that blue families and red families fall into dichotomous personality cate-
gories-modernists or "nuturant mothers" and traditionalists or "strict
fathers," respectively. 27 Modernists express "flexible thinking, tolerance
of diversity, openness to change, and greater emphasis on equality."28
Traditionalists, on the other hand, desire order, respect authority, and
adhere to tradition.29 Increasing homogenization of neighborhoods and
community gathering places, like churches, exacerbate these "genetic dis-
positions."3 0 In addition, Cahn and Carbone quote from studies highlight-
ing that, based on personality traits, people are unlikely to change opin-
ions even when confronted with evidence contradicting their beliefs.3'
20. Id. at 53 (citing studies that show adolescents lack the cognitive ability to make con-
textual judgments about the risks and benefits of their conduct).
21. Id. at 48, 55.
22. Id. at 49.
23. Id. at 194.
24. Id. at 41, 44.
25. Id. at 73.
26. Id. at 61.
27. Id. at 61 (citing GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
THINK (2d ed. 2002)).
28. Id. at 62. Cahn and Carbone explain the blue paradigm's "greater emphasis on equali-
ty" by citing the research of the Yale Cultural Cognition Project, which found that traditional-
ists are likely to value solidarity and hierarchy, whereas modernists prefer egalitarian individu-
alism. Id. at 63.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id. at 66-69.
31. Id. at 65.
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Personality types may help explain why disagreements about the func-
tion and composition of families appear so intractable. Yet the focus on
personality or cognitive predilections can obscure the importance of
institutional arrangements that shape people's choices. Cahn and
Carbone acknowledge the political function that the partisan debate
about family values plays.32 Nevertheless, they de-emphasize the role of
alliances between conservative groups and religious organizations in cul-
tivating shared values in red states. Many have analyzed the modem
decay of municipal and state infrastructures in red states, and the ways
that religious groups promoting traditional values have filled the gap. 33
Indeed, other popular work describes how the Republican Party tapped
into feelings of displacement of those outside large urban centers, in
poorly managed or suffering state economies, through coalitions with
community and religious organizations. 3 4
The danger of framing red/blue politics in terms of personality is not
only that it suggests beliefs are impermeable, rather than shaped by
changing socioeconomic forces, but also that it influences how to close
the gap between opposing positions. Instead of discussing systemic
reform of local economies, the conversation revolves around messaging
that can reach differing personality types-a point addressed in more
detail in Part III of this review. The next part first describes the issues that
Cahn and Carbone believe are emblematic of the current tension between
family paradigms.
III. The Dividing Lines of the Family Values Debate
The second part of Red Families v. Blue Families undertakes the com-
plicated task of mapping demographic patterns against a backdrop of
state and federal laws. Cahn and Carbone persuasively argue that issues
like abortion, sex education, and same-sex marriage are contentious
because they evoke fundamental disagreements about "how to build fam-
ily support."35
Their objective, however, is not to rehash familiar debates. Rather, by
highlighting that blue states "as a whole" differ from red states "as a
32. See id. at 92-93 (describing "the identification of Republican Party with traditionalist
values" as well as the coalition that the Reagan administration built with religious groups
opposing abortion).
33. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PuTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
34. For example, Cahn and Carbone cite Thomas Frank's best-seller, What's the Matter
with Kansas?, which details Republican alliances with evangelical religious groups. CAHN &
CARBONE, supra note 1, at 105, n.82; see also THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH
KANSAS? How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA 94 (2004).
35. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 74.
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whole" on controversial subjects, Cahn and Carbone illustrate "how the
acceptance of a new family regime translates into types of legal decision
making."36 Different goals, such as the desire to curb premarital sexuality
or the promotion of equality, underpin this legal decision-making in ways
that, as Cahn and Carbone emphasize, do not always match the realities
and needs of either red or blue family life.37
Cahn and Carbone begin by noting the dramatic changes to the inter-
personal and legal regulation of sex during the 1960s and 1970s. They
chart three pivotal influences-the substantial increase of women
enrolling in college; the introduction and popularity of the birth control
pill; 3 8 and decisions of the United States Supreme Court striking down
laws prohibiting couples, married and unmarried, from using contracep-
tives.39 Cahn and Carbone describe a synergy between blue family ideas
and birth control as women newly graduated from college had better job
prospects and access to legal family planning services. Birth control per-
mitted women to engage in sexual activity before marriage (which they
postponed to pursue careers) with less risk of unwanted pregnancy.4
Over the course of two decades, the national conversation about birth
control changed from criminalization to government subsidization.
Congress enacted family planning programs through Medicaid and Title
X of the Public Health Service Act to reduce the number of children born
to low-income women and to decrease welfare expenditures. 4 ' The bipar-
tisan support that characterized the initial programs for confidential and
free family planning services soon dwindled. The Reagan administration
cut funding for family planning, which subsequent administrations have
never restored completely.42
Decreases in government funding, however, did not impede access to
birth control for those who could afford it. Indeed, objections to the broad
availability of birth control pale in comparison to the furor over abor-
tion-"the rallying cry for the return to traditional values."43 Relying
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 82 (noting that by 1963 1.75 million women were using oral contraceptives-two
years before the Supreme Court held that laws barring contraceptives for married people uncon-
stitutional).
39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
40. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 84.
41. Cahn and Carbone, as many others, note the racist undertones of public family pro-
grams. Id. at 86-87. See, e.g., Rebekah Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive
Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 151, 179-80 (2006) (noting
racism in contemporary limits on family size for welfare recipients).
42. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 90.
43. Id. at 91.
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again on the personality types described in the first part, Cahn and
Carbone contend that Republican alignment with antichoice groups,
which framed abortion as a stark moral choice, corresponds to absolutist/
"strict father" personality preferences." The authors, of course, recognize
that other events influenced abortion politics. The point they emphasize,
however, is that the abortion debate, as currently framed, strikes a chord
with traditionalists and alienates modernists.
Cahn and Carbone explain red and blue reactions to abortion through
the example of laws that require parental consent or notice before a minor
has an abortion.45 In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Bellotti v. Baird that
parents cannot exercise a veto over a minor's decision to have an abortion
and that state laws must provide an alternative to parental involvement.46
In most states, this alternative is a court hearing in which a judge deter-
mines whether a minor acting without a parent is sufficiently mature to
decide to have an abortion or an abortion is in the minor's best interests.
Since Bellotti, however, the Court has upheld parental notice or consent
laws that do not work in practice. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, a divided
Supreme Court upheld a law that required notice to both parents even
though the lower court found, based on expert witness testimony, that the
law was too burdensome on minors, that judges were unequipped to gauge
maturity or best interests for abortion purposes, and that the two-parent
notice requirement exacerbated family strife (when, for example, parents
were separated or abusive).4 7 Hodgson signaled that the "Supreme Court
could no longer reach agreement either on the substance of parental
involvement laws or on the judicial role of managing the litigation it pro-
duced." 48
Mandated parental involvement, Cahn and Carbone argue, "goes to the
heart of the symbolic divisions between family paradigms and ... marital
and motherhood expectations [that young women's] communities expect
[of] them."49 They make the case that parental consent or notice fails on
their own terms: the laws endanger, rather than protect, the health and
44. Id. at 93.
45. Id. at 95-96. Cahn and Carbone note that abortion has not always been the subject of
political disagreement. For an account of the public debate before Roe v. Wade, see LINDA
GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VoIcES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION
DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING (2010).
46. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (holding that minors need an alternative
to parental involvement that is "completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide
an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained").
47. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp.
756, 774-75 (D. Minn. 1986), reversed by 853 F.2d 1452, 1455 (8th Cir. 1988).
48. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 99.
49. Id. at 95.
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well-being of minors, and do not encourage parent-child dialogue about
pregnancy options.s0 Despite the laws' inefficacy, parental notice and con-
sent statutes enjoy wide bipartisan popularity. State legislatures have
passed parental involvement laws in forty-four states, ' and thirty-seven
statutes are in force today.52 Perhaps this appeal is not surprising, given
that the legal system has traditionally granted parents the right to monitor
and to make decisions about their daughters' health care. As Cahn and
Carbone note, it was not until the 1970s that teens could make independ-
ent decisions about birth control, much less abortion, without parental
approval. 53 Moreover, consent or notice laws are arguably the less puni-
tive version of laws that penalized extramarital teen sexuality. In the not
too distant past, laws punished teenage pregnancy through school expul-
sions, placement in maternity homes, and criminal penalties.54
Cahn and Carbone are clearly concerned about the treatment of mar-
ginalized minors at the hands of the law. Although Cahn and Carbone
argue that consent or notice laws hurt already vulnerable minors (such as
those with strained parental relationships), they contend that statutes in
blue states ease these burdens.55 They point to statutes that allow a non-
parent adult to consent or receive notice; change the age of majority for
abortion; or allow a physician to consent. Wisconsin, for example, permits
an adult family member, such as a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling,
50. Id. at 102-03. Decades of studies urge that parental involvement laws do not fulfill their
own purposes. See, e.g., Rachel Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 687-93 (1988) (summarizing stud-
ies showing that parental involvement laws fail to meet their stated aims, namely, to improve
child-parent communication); AMANDA DENNIS ET AL., GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF
LAWS REQUIRING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FOR ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEw 27-28 (2009)
(summarizing studies that show abortion rates do not decrease with consent or notice laws and
that the level of parental consultation remains static).
51. Six states-Connecticut, Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington-and
the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions that have not enacted laws mandating
parental involvement for all minors. A Connecticut statute permits counseling about the value
of parental notification for minors, but does not mandate it. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-601
(2010).
52. Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Parental Involvement in Minors'
Abortions, at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-PFMA.pdf (last visited Sept.
28, 2010) (describing the parental involvement laws of thirty-four states, but omitting the laws
of Maryland and Maine (which have physician waivers) and Alaska). Unless enjoined by a
court, a new Alaskan notice law took effect in December 2010. See Medical News Today,
Alaskan Voters Approve Parental Notification Ballot Initiative, Aug. 26, 2010, at http://www.
medicalnewstoday.comlarticles/199006.php.
53. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 83, 97 (noting that until 1977 all states required
parental consent for contraceptive use and that parental control over minors' medical decisions
enjoys a long history).
54. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse
of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 476 (2009).
55. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 101.
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who is at least twenty-five years old, to give consent.56 In Delaware, the
age of majority for abortion decisions is sixteen years old.57 Maine and
Maryland allow a physician to waive parental involvement if the minor is
mature or an abortion is in her best interests (the standards that judges
apply in judicial bypass hearings).5 8 Blue states are more likely to pass
notice, rather than consent, statutes, and only red states require two-par-
ent consent (North Dakota and Mississippi) or both notice and consent
(Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming).
A recent study by the nonprofit organization, the National Partnership
for Women & Families, shows that a state's statute may have little to do
with minors' abortion access. 60 The study compared the law on the books
to the law in practice through 155 interviews with judges, lawyers, advo-
cates, court clerks, state agency employees, and clinic staff members. 6 1
The final report demonstrates that a significant population of minors can-
not consult their parents for logistical or personal reasons, and, for that
cohort, the judicial bypass is not a meaningful alternative to parental con-
sent or notice.62 In only a few places, the alternative to parental involve-
ment is a process in which most minors, from any part of a state, have the
information and means necessary to seek a bypass without significant
delay, cost, or embarrassment.
One might suspect that notice laws are less restrictive because parents
or guardians need not agree to the abortion. The National Partnership's
study, however, found that notice laws and consent laws often operate the
same. For example, many abortion providers require parents to sign notice
56. Wis. STAT. § 48.375 (2010).
57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1782-83 (2010).
58. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 1597-A
(2010). Maine's statute gives the minor the option of a bypass hearing or state-mandated coun-
seling, which the abortion provider delivers. The provider must describe, among other things,
the alternatives to and risks of abortion; encourage minors to consult with parents; and record
the minors' reasons for not seeking parental consent.
59. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 101.
60. See Rachel Rebouch6, Parental Involvement and New Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER (forthcoming 2011) (describing the National Partnership study and the gap between
law and practice in parental involvement laws).
61. NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BYPASSING JUSTICE: PREGNANT
MINORS AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS 10 (2010) (on file with the author). The author was
an associate director of adolescent health programs at the National Partnership and co-wrote,
with Anne Dellinger, BYPASSING JUSTICE. For additional information about the report and judi-
cial bypass project, see www.nationalpartnership.org.
62. See, e.g., Ted Joyce, Parental Consent for Abortion and the Judicial Bypass Option in
Arkansas: Effects and Correlates, 42 PERS. SEXUAL & REPRO. HEALTH 168, 173 (2010) (noting
that ten percent of pregnant minors petition for a bypass in one state and comparing the estimate
that forty percent of minors indicate they would not consult a parent in electing abortion).
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attestation forms in person.63 The study also found that a physician waiv-
er does not necessarily result in a more consistent, or less restrictive,
application of the maturity and best interests standards. Although the pol-
itics of a state can foster a more or less hospitable atmosphere for abor-
tion, the best indication of what makes a consent or notice law "workable"
is not whether the state votes "blue" or "red." Rather, a fair process fre-
quently depends on the relationship among providers, judges, reproduc-
tive rights advocates, and other professionals facilitating minors' access to
courts and clinics.6
Parental involvement evokes commonly held beliefs that bridge,
potentially in ways Cahn and Carbone dislike, the family values divide.
Blue families that are "pro-choice" nonetheless embrace rights to
parental autonomy when the decisions of their own children are at stake.
Resonating with the book's premise that practices do not necessarily fol-
low values, what blue parents believe for other people's children may not
be how they view their own children's reproductive or relationship deci-
sions. Recognition of this particular commonality could also help illumi-
nate the diversity within and the overlap between red and blue families.
The barriers to clinical and legal services in almost all parental involve-
ment states suggest that adolescents from both red and blue homes can
face similar problems-parents that are unavailable, unsympathetic, or
unable to assist them, for example.
Perhaps Cahn and Carbone's mapping of blue and red differences
better captures the debate about sex education, where similar issues about
parental control over teen sexuality are at stake. As with consent and
notice laws, Cahn and Carbone express frustration that states and the
federal government (though to a lesser extent now) continue to fund
abstinence-only programs, despite evidence that they are ineffectual. As
with minors who cannot access abortion because of legal and practical
impediments, the authors worry about the well-being of adolescents car-
rying unwanted pregnancies because they lacked information about or
access to contraceptives. Again, in Cahn and Carbone's view, personali-
ty differences are partly to blame. Traditionalists believe, based largely
on religious views, that sex is sacred, and modernists believe in sexual
autonomy and fulfillment. These beliefs translate into state policies gov-
erning sex education in public schools. Blue states reject abstinence-only
funding, and red states do not.65
63. BYPASSING JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 35, 37.
64. Rebouchi, supra note 60, at 31. Cf CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 191 (arguing that
physician waivers and nonparent adult consent makes parental involvement laws "more work-
able").
65. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 112-15.
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Likewise, the same-sex marriage debate reveals stark divisions
between red and blue families. All of the states (and the District of
Columbia) that recognize same-sex marriage vote Democratic. 66 Cahn
and Carbone argue that opposition to same-sex marriage is fiercest in
solidly red regions. They link the decline of marriage in the poorer parts
of the country, where the ability to marry has become a "marker of
class," 67 and the failure of marriage promotion programs 68 to the rejection
of same-sex marriage. Indeed, popular "red" arguments against same-sex
marriage mirror the interests that states assert in defending "traditional"
marriage: stability of heterosexual unions; the goals of procreation and
child rearing; and the preservation of traditional relationships between
men and women through marriage.6 9
Cahn and Carbone note two areas where changing sexual mores and
family structure have not attracted the same level of debate or resulted in
various laws of questionable effectiveness-custody for a parent cohabi-
tating with a same (or opposite) sex partner and marriage promotion
efforts that respond to high divorce rates. Taking the custody example
first, Cahn and Carbone note a quiet revolution in the tone and outcomes
of custody and visitation hearings. Courts across the country, with notable
exceptions,70 no longer treat a parent's nonmarital cohabitation as per se
evidence that a parent is "unfit" or as presumptively harmful to children.
Although courts in red states were slower to adopt this approach, almost
all courts now treat a parent's relationship or sexual orientation like any
other factor in a best interests determination.71
The decline of marriage and introduction of widespread no-fault
divorce has not sparked the same political polarization as same-sex mar-
riage, abortion, or sex education. 72 Many states, red and blue, have enact-
ed marriage promotion policies, funded in part by the federal government
during both Republican and Democrat administrations. For the most
66. The exception may be Iowa, which voted Democratic in the 2008 presidential election
but voted Republican in the 2004 presidential election.
67. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 118.
68. Id. at 120 ("researchers have found that there is no magic prescription to promote mar-
riage, and there is thus no one way for the law to respond").
69. Id. at 128-31. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 343 (Mass. 2003);
In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 781-85 (Cal. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862,
898-904 (Iowa 2009), Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 289 Conn. 135, 251-60 (Conn.
2008).
70. Cahn and Carbone describe custody cases decided in Arkansas, in which the court held
that a parent's involvement in a same-sex relationship creates a presumption of unfitness. CAHN
& CARBONE, supra note 1, at 149-50.
71. Id. at 148.
72. Id. at 121-22.
73. Id. at 123-25.
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part, these policies advertise marriage's benefits, offer couples communi-
cation and problem-solving tips, and have attracted little public debate.74
Where blue and red states differ are covenant marriage laws, which, in
addition to affirming the value of marriage, erect procedural barriers to
divorce. The three states enacting laws that essentially make divorce more
difficult vote Republican. However, as Cahn and Carbone illustrate, only
very low percentages of marrying couples choose covenant marriages.
Interestingly, Cahn and Carbone pit two categories of laws against each
other. The first set dealing with abortion, same-sex marriage, and sex edu-
cation have become emblematic of the culture war. Although custody and
marriage promotion are at the heart of family structure, the second set of
laws have not been lightening rods of controversy. Cahn and Carbone
attribute the diffusion of tension in the latter category to the triumph of
lived experience over ideology. In custody determinations, opposition to
parental relationship choices does not trump the best interests of children.
In marriage promotion, distaste for divorce does not trump the needs of
people seeking exit from bad relationships. What both examples purport
to show is a gradual recognition, across most states, that political alle-
giances should give way to the everyday needs of family members. The
real danger of abortion laws, same-sex-marriage bans, and abstinence-
only programs, then, is that they have not kept pace with people's day-to-
day lives and disadvantage those who cannot navigate around the law. For
example, Cahn and Carbone argue that parental consent and abstinence-
only laws are dangerous because, in addition to being ineffective, they
punish low-income women, who too early become mothers and incur the
costs that come with childbearing.
Cahn and Carbone seek to help both red and blue families meet their
needs and come to compromise on contentious subjects. They appear
sympathetic to marriage promotion programs, reasoning that couples in
long-term, stable relationships experience greater financial stability and
create environments conducive to child rearing." As such, they advocate
marriage promotion policies that address what make marriages difficult
(through premarital counseling programs, for instance) without penalizing
couples when marriages fail (as covenant marriage laws do).76
The next part considers the book's proposals to "allow each part of the
country to redefine family aspirations;" to reinvent regulation of the work-
place and health care system in order to meet the needs of caretakers and
potential parents; and to move away from divisive topics like abortion to
74. Id. at 126.
75. Id. at 162-63.
76. Id. at 156-59.
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those that "can succeed with diverse groups," such as availability of birth
control.77 However, the prescription of "changing the subject" of the fam-
ily values debate may not address the causes of division between red and
blue families that Cahn and Carbone identify.
IV. Obstacles to Consensus
The final part of Red Families v. Blue Families does not argue for
changed attitudes; instead, it in the main recommends changing the sub-
ject.78 As noted, Cahn and Carbone propose that discussions about abor-
tion should instead focus on the importance of contraceptive use in pre-
venting unwanted pregnancies.79 Instead of debating the emphasis on
abstinence in sex education for teenagers, policy should concentrate on
educating young adults about birth control methods.80 Rather than polic-
ing which couples states should allow to marry, legislation should focus
on supporting parents in the workplace.'
To this end, Cahn and Carbone seek to reconfigure debates about fam-
ily values, currently discussed as national crises needing one-size-fits-all
solutions, as regional discussions about the needs of diverse families.
Policy in red states should provide assistance for caretakers returning to
school or parenting education for young couples.82 Conversely, policy in
blue places should attend to the fertility needs of women who delayed
childbirth and allow fathers to take paid paternity leave from their jobs.
There are exceptions, however, to localized control of family law matters.
Cahn and Carbone argue, for example, that states should not circumscribe
"intimate and personal private behavior" in laws that would ban abortion,
contraceptives, or same-sex intimate conduct.8 4
Changing the subject, however, may not address how the two main cat-
alysts of the culture war that Cahn and Carbone highlight-economic
inequality and personality traits-will continue to create perpetual "losers
and winners." The authors explain that blue families' modernist approach
is an inevitable consequence of a changing economy. Cahn and Carbone
highlight the complex role of class, but, for the most part, they rely on
class to characterize blue families as wealthy or middle class and red fam-
77. Id. at 208-09.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 184-86.
80. Id. at 174-79.
81. Id. at 190-92.
82. Id. at 151-58.
83. Id. at 186-87.
84. Id. at 163-64, 174. The authors argue, however, that states should have discretion to
decide whether to permit same-sex marriage. Id.
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ilies as working class or low-income earners.s An immediate objection to
these generalizations is that the red and blue categories are underinclusive.
In addition to discounting diversity within red and blue states, it ignores
wealthy Republicans and working-class Democrats.86 The income distinc-
tion also minimizes the disparities between voting patterns and family ide-
ology. One could readily imagine a family that votes Democratic, but
espouses traditional ideas about family structure because of religious or
ethnic beliefs and commitments. More importantly, it might not be possi-
ble to talk about class politics without a robust conversation about race. If
the image of the red family is implicitly white and rural and the blue fam-
ily is white and urban, then red/blue family constructs exclude the experi-
ences of all other racial groups and reflect an incomplete picture of mod-
ern American communities.
Cahn and Carbone acknowledge that their definitions of red and blue
families have these shortcomings. Even setting these criticisms aside,
accepting the economic imbalance between red and blue families necessi-
tates living with economic inequality that pits families against each other.
By the book's own terms, blue families will always come out on top finan-
cially (because the economy rewards blue lifestyle choices), and red
families will always be on bottom. As Cahn and Carbone show, young
people in nonurban, noncommercial centers choose early childbearing not
out of personal preferences but because it poses no significant barriers to
existing employment or education prospects. Conversely, Cahn and
Carbone imply that it would make sense for a young person from a red
community to develop a blue lifestyle after receiving a scholarship for
college. Proposals for closing the culture gap that do not recognize the
implicit preference for blue choices and the resource asymmetry that these
preferences create may have little hope in scaling back debate. Indeed, the
culture war may help sustain inequality by naturalizing the idea that
not all places can accommodate a population of wealthy, well-educated
people. Not all families can be blue families. 87
The same impasse may result if, as Cahn and Carbone suggest, division
between red and blue families is a product of personality differences. The
cognitive science on which Cahn and Carbone rely indicates that some
level of conflict will always exist between contextualists/modemists and
85. Cahn and Carbone acknowledge that the relationship between voting patterns and
income is not perfect. Id. at 10- 11.
86. Cahn and Carbone acknowledge this point briefly, too, by noting the diversity of red
families. Id. at 30. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Purple Haze, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (making this criticism in a review of Red Families v. Blue Families).
87. Cahn and Carbone's proposals advocate income and other assistance for young parents,
especially young mothers. However, they stop short of casting most (if not all) of their solutions
as either direct or indirect economic support for red families.
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absolutists/traditionalists. As absolutists, red thinkers, by definition, are
loathe to compromise." The authors appear hopeful that if regional stake-
holders can negotiate policies that mediate personality differences, the
national culture war might subside. However, as Cahn and Carbone's pro-
posals show, political compromise on family values may inherently favor
red ideals over blue ones. Flipping the power dynamics that the new econ-
omy produces (which implicitly favor blue families), an acceptable agree-
ment for absolutists likely requires policies that incorporate a significant
amount of deference to traditional family structures and norms, which
emphasize the centrality of marriage and childrearing. For example, Cahn
and Carbone suggest that both camps might agree that everyone wants a
"stable family." They also contend that the red vision of a stable family
relies on spouses playing traditional gender roles, whereas the blue con-
cept is one in which equality defines partners' roles. An effort to re-envi-
sion these roles, perhaps through education or workplace advancement,
may incite the very debate that Cahn and Carbone hope to avoid.
Certainly, the authors are not blind to the power differentials between
red and blue families. Cahn and Carbone are frank about the limitations
of their approach: "We are pessimistic . . . that genuine family transfor-
mation can occur without addressing the growing inequality that has
exacerbated the pressures on family life."89 The purpose of this review is
to highlight the tenacity of division as a means of supporting the book's
larger objective-to facilitate a more transparent conversation about the
personal, economic, and social interests that make the terms of the coun-
try's family values debate difficult to change.
V. Conclusion
Red Families v. Blue Families is intensely concerned with the well-
being of all families, which seems to be the best justification for finding
common ground. Even if the reader disagrees with the authors' policy
proposals, Cahn and Carbone have created an important and innovative
new language for conversations about family values. Their intervention is
timely in an era where accommodation seems unsatisfying and answers
88. Democrats, in fact, have tried some of the "changes of subjects" that Cahn and Carbone
advocate, especially in the context of abortion, with little apparent success. For example, in
2002, President Clinton supported abortion that was legal, safe, and rare, arguing that contra-
ceptive use should help reduce abortion. Since then, Democrats have repeated the phrase to
advance an agenda for broader contraception access. See Susan A. Cohen, Toward Making
Abortion 'Rare': The Shifting Battleground over the Means to an End, 9 GurrMACHER POL'Y
REv. 2 (2006), at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/l/gpr090102.pdf.
89. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 1, at 14.
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are elusive in the culture war. 90 Red Families v. Blue Families asks us to
imagine a broader and better agenda.
90. See Sam Tanenhaus, Sound of Silence: The Culture Wars Take a Break, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2009, at WKI ("Accommodations [between right and left politics], the hallmark of
consensus, present their own risks.").
